The emergence and evolution of city deals in Scotland by Waite, David et al.
Waite, David and Maclennan, Duncan and Roy, Graeme and McNulty, Des 
(2018) The emergence and evolution of city deals in Scotland. Fraser of 
Allander Economic Commentary, 42 (4). pp. 75-90. ISSN 2046-5378 , 
This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/66336/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the Strathprints administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
The Strathprints institutional repository (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk) is a digital archive of University of Strathclyde research 
outputs. It has been developed to disseminate open access research outputs, expose data about those outputs, and enable the 
management and persistent access to Strathclyde's intellectual output.
Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
The emergence and evolution of City Deals in Scotland 
David Waite, Duncan Maclennan, Graeme Roy, Des McNulty 
 
 
Abstract 
There is a resurgent policy emphasis on the role of city-regions as drivers of economic growth. 
Officials and leaders in such metropolitan areas, however, are confronted with challenges 
relating to administrative fragmentation, achieving alignment with national policy objectives, 
and demonstrating the capabilities to plan, finance and deliver effective policy interventions 
and investments. As a response to these challenges, policymakers are fashioning new 
governance arrangements, attached to experimental policy mechanisms, to develop urban 
policy. Of note, City Deals have recently emerged in the UK, and this paper charts their evolution 
across the UK, with a focus on the devolved administrations in particular. The paper ends with 
some reflections and questions about their roll out in Scotland. 
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I The UK context 
Changing institutional arrangements have been a persistent feature of the urban policy 
landscape in the UK, as the challenge of addressing uneven economic performance across and 
within UK city-regions remains (Centre for Cities, 2015; Tyler et al., 2017; McCann, 2016). It is 
clear that there has been both churn over time in the tools, strategies and approaches set out to 
address this issue (Jones, 2010; Pike et al., 2015) as well as marked contrasts between England 
and the now devolved administrations of the UK (Maclennan et al., 2017). A reasoned growth-
role for infrastructure projects and programmes has seldom been at the core of national policies 
for cities, and the fitful nature of infrastructure planning and provision, coupled with questions 
about prioritisation approaches, reflect long standing policy challenges (NAO, 2016a). However, 
infrastructure investment, city-region growth and devolution are converging as key policy 
interests within UK City Deals. 
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City Deals reflect a novel policy response to issues of sub-national economic development and 
hinge on the notion that local leaders are in the best position to determine interventions for their 
areas. Since 2012 ó and across two waves, starting with the major cities outside of London ó 
urban areas in England have been signing deals with the UK Government to secure funding 
SDFNDJHVWRVXSSRUWHFRQRPLFJURZWK:DUG2ö%ULHQDQG3LNH&LW\'HDOVZKLFK
are set out across periods up to 30 years, cover a suite of policy areas ó including infrastructure 
investment, business support, employment and welfare interventions (Centre for Cities, 2014) 
ó and have been developed alongside the dismantling of the prior architecture for sub-national 
economic development in England (the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs))1. City Deals cut 
across political differences to some degree, as numerous Labour-led localities in England have 
now agreed deals with the Conservative-led government in Westminster (Jenkins, 2015). 
City Deals, unlike more traditional urban and regional initiatives in the UK, have a distinctive 
one by one form where localities form agreements with the UK government (and, in some 
instances, a devolved administration). Proponents see progress on localism through such an 
incremental approach - where powers and capacities are decentralised in modest steps - as a 
major attribute. Though evidence for the link between devolution and economic growth is 
unclear (Pike et al., 2012), the arguments for localism in the UK have gained ground as the 
impact of central policy orchestration and control on uneven development has been seen to be 
limited (Travers, 2015; McCann, 2016). Deal-making, in this context, represents a pragmatic 
stance given the different starting points of localities to take on further responsibilities. It is 
logical, some have suggested, that cities at the vanguard with demonstrable capacities and 
competencies should take what opportunities there are to agree decentralising arrangements 
(Cox et al., 2014). The UK is highly centralised in terms of where revenue and spending powers 
reside, therefore it is claimed, localities need to exploit the openings for greater local policy 
design and influence (Harrison, 2015). 
The piecemeal nature of the deal-making approach raises interesting questions, however, 
regarding the nature of policymaking processes; both across the policy system (that spurs deal-
making) and within individual deals. Indeed, reflecting an opportunity to firm up the clarity and 
guidance provided to localities negotiating a deal, some have recommended that an 
independent body should be formed to set out a clear path for localities to follow (RSA, 2015; 
                                                     
1 There were eight RDAs in England prior to 2012 (plus the London Development Agency), covering geographies in 
England such as the North West and East Midlands. 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
Pike et al., 2016; Blond and Morrin, 2015; Ayres et al., 2016). The UK Government has recently 
FRPPLWWHGWRGHYHORSLQJDøGHYROXWLRQIUDPHZRUNùZKLFKPD\SURYLGe some response to this 
issue (Jeffrey, 2018). At an individual deal-making level, furthermore, others have questioned 
the manner by which deals are struck, and, more particularly, the nature and extent of citizen 
and community participation (Prosser et al., 2018). 
A series of principles underpin the roll out of City Deals. First, City Deals hinge on a rejection of 
øRQH-size-fits-DOOù SROLF\PDNLQJ +0 *RYHUQPHQW D 7KH HFRQRPLHV RI 1HZFDVWOH DQG
Bristol, for example, differ in terms of the pressures and opportunities they confront, and thus 
policies need to be tailored to local contexts. Additional housing may be the capital investment 
priority in one city, whilst in another, a new rail link to open up access to employment sites may 
be the primary concern. Though individual deals vary in how bespoke they appear - with central 
JRYHUQPHQWVHHQWRVWURQJO\GHWHUPLQHWKHVKDSHDQGQDWXUHRIGHDOGHYHORSPHQW2ö%ULHQDQG
Pike, 2018; Pike et al., 2016) - one can point to a number of examples, such as proposals for an 
oil and gas innovation centre in Aberdeen (a city highly dependent on the natural resources 
sector) that reflect context-sensitive responses (HM Government, 2016b). In our view, the aim 
to develop bespoke agreements ó giving some scope for innovation in policy design - is arguably 
the strongest feature of the City Deal approach (Cheshire et al., 2014). 
Second, robust local governance is central to deal-making, as the UK Government seeks to 
ensure localities have sufficient structures in place to manage the obligations and risks. A 
number of City Deals, for example, present an incentivising logic by inserting a payment-by-
results mechanism. This requires localities to demonstrate progress on growth objectives at 
IL[HG LQWHUYDOV øJDWHZD\ù SHULRGV LQ order to release further capital funding within an 
infrastructure fund (HM Government, 2014). Forms of governance vary across the deals ó 
depending on the nature and magnitude of the deals at stake, as well as enabling legislation ó 
yet common themes can be identified. In this respect, a requirement for mayors in England has 
emerged based on more recent devolution deals. Drawing on in-vogue urban public 
management perspectives (Barber, 2013) - but with their efficacy disputed by others (Pike, 
2017) - the impulse for mayors has yet to spread to Scotland or Wales. Additionally, business 
interests are often closely coupled to governance arrangements, whether formally secured 
through local enterprise partnership (LEP) associations in England, or new organisations (e.g. 
&DUGLII +0 *RYHUQPHQW G RU øUHJLRQDO HQWHUSULVH FRXQFLOVù HJ (GLQEXUJK &LW\ RI
Edinburgh Council, 2018) being formed in the devolved nation contexts.  
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Third, devising policy at functional economic geographies reflects a key technical consideration 
for deal-makers. Central to this idea is that urban policy needs to be shaped to respond to the 
dominant flows that make up urban systems, notably commuting and transport patterns. For 
cities such as Glasgow and Manchester, where the central local authority area significantly 
under-bounds its commuting geography, it is seen to be problematic that urban policy and 
investment strategies focus solely on the administrative area. In this way, City Deals have given 
some support to an emergent city-regionalism in the UK (with local authorities working together, 
and, for follow-on deals in England, mayoral combined authorities being formed) (Beel et al., 
2016). Some, however, point to the clamour to cut a deal overriding the coherent demarcation 
of functional economic geographies (e.g. the North of Tyne devolution deal that excludes 
Gateshead (Tomaney, 2018)). 
$ORQJVLGH &LW\ 'HDO PHFKDQLVPV PRUHRYHU WKHUH DUH SROLF\ WKHPHV OLQNHG WR WKH 8.öV VXE-
national economic development challenges. Most prominently, spatial rebalancing ó and the 
still widening gap between London and the south-east, and the rest of the UK - is a key focus for 
the UK Government (Martin et al., 2016). Indeed, processes of industrial restructuring and the 
clustering of high-growth sectors in the south-east of England present questions, now long-
running, about how the economic bases in the rest of the UK can be rejuvenated. Whilst the 
north-south divide is not explicitly mentioned in City Deal documentation, think-tanks have 
framed the issue as central to urban policy (Centre for Cities, 2015). Related to this are debates 
in England about inequalities in infrastructure spending (Overman, 2014; IPPR North, 2017) and 
the advantages London is seen to enjoy (McCann, 2016). The Northern Powerhouse which 
broadly seeks to improve linkages across major urban centres in the north of England (Overman 
et al., 2009), can be seen as a political response to the spatial divide in economic outcomes 
0DF.LQQRQIRUWKFRPLQJ7KHø3RZHUKRXVHùDJHQGDZDVLQIOuenced by the RSA City Growth 
Commission (2014) and a UK Government strategy has recently been released to give it impetus 
(HM Government, 2016c). Though clarity is emerging in some respects, others have questioned 
whether the policy reflects more brand than strategy, and whether aspects of funding are re-
packaged rather than new (Lee, 2017; MacKinnon, forthcoming). This new push for pan-Northern 
co-operation in England (Parr, 2017) ó which has yet to spur comparator initiatives in the 
devolved administrations2 - sits at a cross-regional level going beyond individual, typically city-
region focused deals.  
                                                     
2 7KHUHKDYHEHHQLQLWLDOGLVFXVVLRQVDERXWDøZHVWHUQSRZHUKRXVHùOLQNLQJ&DUGLIIWR%ULVWRO 
 Table 1 ó City Deals and the wider evolution of deal-based policymaking in the UK 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
City Deals  
(incl. head of 
terms)  
 
Proposal for City 
Deals introduced in 
ø8QORFNLQJ JURZWK LQ
FLWLHVù 
Wave 1 ó 8 English 
Core Cities 
Wave 2 begins Wave 2 ó agreements 
for a further 18 
English cities 
 
Glasgow 
 Cardiff 
Inverness 
Aberdeen 
Swansea 
Edinburgh 
 
Stirling; Tay Cities 
(Discussions in 
progress for Belfast 
and Derry City) 
 
Growth Deals    First Growth Deals 
(giving funding for 
LEPs in England) 
Announcement of 
expansion to deals 
Further funding in 
Budget and then 
Autumn Statement 
Negotiations for 
North Wales and 
Scottish Borderlands 
(in the Autumn 
statement) 
(Ayrshire 
commitment; Moray 
negotiation; Mid-
Wales discussions) 
 
Devolution Deals 
 
   Devolution Deal for 
Greater Manchester 
Devolution deals for 
Sheffield; North East; 
Tees Valley; 
West Midlands; and 
Liverpool City Region 
 
Devolution deal for 
Cornwall 
Devolution deals for 
East Anglia; Greater 
Lincolnshire; and 
West of England 
Five updates/ 
iterations to the 
Greater Manchester 
devolution 
arrangement by 
2017. Second 
devolution deal for 
the West Midlands. 
 
North of Tyne 
Mayoral 
elections 
 
      Held in May for 
Greater Manchester; 
Liverpool City Region; 
Cambridgeshire / 
Peterborough; West 
Midlands; West of 
England; Tees Valley 
Sheffield City Region 
(held in May) 
Legislation  
 
Localism Act     Cities and Local 
Government 
Devolution Act 
  
Major 
strategies/ 
advocacy 
positions 
 
Scottish Government 
ó Agenda for Cities 
Welsh Government ó 
Haywood task and 
finish group report on 
city-regions 
 
 RSA City Growth 
Commission (noting 
øSRZHUKRXVHV 
 UK Government - 
Northern Powerhouse 
Strategy 
 
Scottish Government 
ó updated Agenda for 
Cities 
UK Government -
Industrial Strategy 
white paper 
(references City 
Deals; notes 
Transforming Cities 
Fund for transport in 
England) 
Local industrial 
strategies being 
prepared in England 
Sources: :DUG6DQGIRUG1$2E*UD\HWDODXWKRUVöRZQHODERUDWLRQ  
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III     City Deals in the devolved administrations 
Starting with the Glasgow City Deal agreed in the summer of 2014, City Deals have gradually 
been rolling out across the devolved administrations and are now the preferred mechanisms, it 
would appear, for supporting sub-national economic development (Table 2 sets out the features 
of the Scottish deals to date). Writing in this publication previously, the cities policy advocate 
*UHJ&ODUNKDVVXJJHVWHGWKDWø>FLW\OHDGHUV@QHHGWREHHPSRZHUHGùDQGWKDWLQWKH6FRWWLVK
FRQWH[W&LW\'HDOVøFRXOGKDYHDQLPSRUWDQWLPSDFWLQLQFUHDVLQJXUEDQSURGXFWLYLW\ù&ODUNHW
al., 2016: 7). Coupled with the apparent enthusiasm for deal-making in the Scottish and 
devolved administration contexts ó with deals contributing to what some have described as a 
øFOXWWHUHGù HFRQRPLF SROLF\ FRQWH[W )UDVHU RI $OODQGHU ,QVWLWXWH   - new political 
dynamics have emerged. 
Deals in Scotland and Wales present a tripartite politics whereby the UK government, the 
devolved administration and the relevant set of local authorities (for the particular city-region) 
are bound into negotiation and eventual commitments. Here, local alongside national 
devolution claims emerge. The former leader of Cardiff Council argued, for example, for greater 
support and autonomy from the Welsh Government ó DUJXLQJ WKDW&RXQFLOVKDYHEHHQøKHOG
EDFNùDQGQHHGWRøUHFHLYHDVXIILFLHQWOHYHORIIXQGLQJDQGEHJLYHQWKHSRZHUV>QHHGHG@þù
(Bale cited in Silk, 2016). Meanwhile the Secretary of State for Scotland (representing the UK 
Government) has argued, in criticising the Scottish Government: 
ø7KHUHLVDUHYROXWLRQJRLQJRQLQORFDOJRYHUQPHQWDFURVVWKHUHVWRIWKH8QLWHG
Kingdom, with local areas regaining power and responsibility at an 
XQSUHFHGHQWHGUDWH6FRWODQGFDQQRWDIIRUGWREHOHIWEHKLQGþ7KHUHLVQRZUHDO
risk that Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Dundee, and indeed the towns and 
counties of Scotland as a whole, will be left behind ó stuck in a 1990s time-warp 
of centralised, Holyrood-GRPLQDQFHù%%& 
7KH 6FRWWLVK *RYHUQPHQWöV FRPPLWPHQW WR IXUWKHU GHDOV DFURVV 6FRWODQG ó indeed coverage 
across the country is sought (Scottish Government, 2018) ó coupled, perhaps, with wider 
localist developments through the Community Empowerment (Scotland) Act and the ongoing 
Local Governance Review, may provide alternative perspectives. Of course, debates over 
funding commitments, through the deal-making negotiations, bring the competing claims on 
deal-making commitments into sharp relief. The apparently differential UK Government and 
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Scottish Government commitments for the Tay Cities reflects this (see table 2))(Buchan, 2018); 
additionally, the Scottish Government point out their £254 million contribution over and above 
the £125 million match commitment to the Aberdeen deal (Scottish Government, 2016). 
A further political consideration is the potential for conflicting, or incommensurable, policy 
agendas to interface within a deal. In Wales, for exampOHWKH:HOVK*RYHUQPHQWöVFRPPLWPHQW
to well-being - given the Well-being of Future Generations (Wales) Act - presents emphases not 
shared in the same way by the UK Government, where deals are framed as economic growth 
drivers principally (Waite and Bristow, 2018). As the Welsh Assembly committee into City Deals 
observed in its final report:  
øþWKHUHLVDFOHDUWHQVLRQEHWZHHQWKH*'3-focus of City Deals, and the Welsh 
*RYHUQPHQWöVEURDGHUGHILQLWLRQVRISURVSHULW\DQGZLGHUDVSLUDWLRQVVHWRXWLQ
the Well-being and Future Generations legislation. While all partners in both the 
Cardiff City Region and Swansea Bay claim that both can be achieved, it is not 
FOHDUDWWKLVVWDJHZKHWKHURUKRZWKDWZLOOEHGRQHù1DWLRQDO$VVHPEO\
for Wales Economy, Infrastructure and Skills Committee, 2017: 19). 
A similar position is presented in Scotland given apparent commitments by the Scottish 
*RYHUQPHQWWRøLQFOXVLYHJURZWKù3, which the Enterprise and Skills review links to City Deals 
expressly (Scottish Government, 2017: 8). Indeed, testimony to a Scottish Parliament committee 
enquiry highlights the tension between UK and Scottish government positions (Scottish 
Parliament Local Government and Communities Committee, 2018: 20). 
 Politics in a horizontal form is also evident across different regions and localities within a 
nation. As in England, deal-making has privileged, at least initially, major cities (with cities seen 
DV øHQJLQHV RI JURZWKù +0 *RYHUQPHQW  +RZHYHU VXFK DQ DSSURDFK LV PHHWLQJ
resistance from those outwith metropolitan areas. Falkirk Council (2017), in their submission to 
the Scottish Parliament committee on city-UHJLRQGHDOVSRLQWHGWRWKHøQHHGWRDYRLGDQRYHU-
HPSKDVLVRQWKHUROHRIFLWLHVùZKLOHWKHVXEPLVVLRQIURPWKH$\UVKLUH*URZWK'eal (2017) notes 
the need for non-city-UHJLRQDUHDVWRUHFHLYHWKHøVDPHOHYHORIDWWHQWLRQù7KHVHSHUVSHFWLYHV
in intimating a city-centrism in policymaking, raise questions of consistency and coherence in 
spatial policy within the devolved administratiRQVDQGLWLVLQWHUHVWLQJWRREVHUYH)LIHöVSRVLWLRQ
within two City Deals agreed (Edinburgh and Tay Cities)).  
                                                     
3 http://www.inclusivegrowth.scot/about-us/ [retrieved 3/12/2018] 
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Underlying such political and strategic concerns, at an operational level, a Scottish City-region 
deal delivery board - which is jointly convened by the Scottish and UK Governments - seeks to: 
SURYLGHJXLGDQFHRQEXVLQHVVFDVHGHYHORSPHQWPRQLWRULPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGDJUHHøDVIDUDV
SRVVLEOHFRPPRQQHJRWLDWLQJSRVLWLRQVù IRUQHZGHDOV4 With respect to the latter, it will be 
interesting to tracNKRZDQGZKHWKHUWKLVERG\DOLJQVZLWKRULVVWHHUHGE\WKH8.*RYHUQPHQWöV
øGHYROXWLRQ IUDPHZRUNù ZKLFK LV GXH WR EH UHOHDVHG LQ ODWH- 0RUHRYHU ZLWK øUHJLRQDO
HFRQRPLFSDUWQHUVKLSVùHPHUJLQJIURPWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWöV(QWHUSULVHDQG6NLOOVUHview 
(2017), their alignment with new governance arrangements for City Deals may reflect key 
institutional developments for urban and regional policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
4 https://www.gov.scot/groups/scottish-city-region-deal-delivery-board/ [retrieved 3/12/2018] 
 Table 2 ó Overview of City Deals in Scotland 
City core 
Name of deal 
Glasgow (1) 
Glasgow City-region City Deal 
Inverness (2) 
Inverness and Highland City-
region Deal 
Aberdeen (3)  
Aberdeen City Region Deal 
Edinburgh (4) 
Edinburgh and South East 
Scotland City Region Deal 
Stirling (5)  
Stirling & Clackmannanshire 
City Region Deal 
Perth and Dundee (6) 
Tay Cities Region Deal 
 
Local 
authority 
partners 
Glasgow City, Inverclyde, East 
Dunbartonshire, West 
Dunbartonshire, East 
Renfrewshire, 
Renfrewshire, North 
Lanarkshire, South Lanarkshire 
 
Highland Aberdeen City, 
Aberdeenshire 
Edinburgh, East Lothian, 
Fife, Midlothian, Scottish 
Borders, West Lothian 
Stirling and 
Clackmannanshire 
Dundee, Angus, Fife and Perth and 
Kinross 
Funding 
(maximum 
amounts) 
£1.13 billion investment fund ó 
£500 million each from the UK 
and Scottish governments, plus 
£130 million from local 
authorities. 20 year period. 
 
øþ WKH 6FRWWLVK *RYHUQPHQW
will commit up to £135 
million. The United Kingdom 
Government will commit up to 
£53 million and the Highland 
Council and regional partners 
have committed up to £127 
PLOOLRQRYHU\HDUVù 
 
ø2YHU WKH QH[W  \HDUV
both Governments are 
committed to jointly 
investing up to £250 
million. Aberdeen City 
Council and Aberdeenshire 
Council and regional 
partners are committed to 
LQYHVWLQJXSWRePLOOLRQù 
£300 million each from the 
Scottish and UK 
governments. Additionally 
øUHJLRQDO SDUWQHUV ZLOO
contribute up to a maximum 
RI ePù RYHU D  \HDU
timeline. 
£45.1 million each from the 
UK and Scottish 
governments (UK 
government capital 
contributions will spread 
RYHU  \HDUV ø5HJLRQDO
partners will match this 
investment with up to 
ePLOOLRQù 
£150 million each from the Scottish 
and UK governments (over 10-15 
years).  
Discussion of a further £50 million 
from the Scottish Government; and 
calls for a like additional 
commitment from the UK 
Government. 
 
Notable 
initiatives 
(some subject 
to business 
case 
approval); not 
an exhaustive 
list 
Infrastructure projects 
including: Canal and North 
Gateway; Clyde Waterfront and 
Renfrew Riverside; Glasgow 
airport investment area. In 
innovation, the City Deal 
supports MediCity and an 
Imaging Centre of Excellence. 
Northern Innovation Hub; 
Science Skills Academy; 
assisted living; investment in 
Inverness Castle for tourism; 
housing; West Link transport; 
øODQG 
remediation to the east of the 
$$/RQJPDQMXQFWLRQù 
Oli and Gas Technology 
Centre; innovation hubs for 
the food and life sciences 
sectors; digital 
infrastructure fund; 
expansion of Aberdeen 
harbour. 
Data driven innovation (DDI) 
research; Integrated 
Regional Employability and 
Skills (IRES) programme; 
A720 city bypass; IMPACT 
centre. 
International Environment 
Centre; Aquaculture Hub; 
international visitor centre; 
digital hub; improved 
transport connections 
between Stirling and Alloa. 
Skills and Employability 
Development Programme support; 
Tay biomedical cluster; 
International Barley Hub; Advanced 
Plant Growth Centre; Cyber Security 
Centre of Excellence; Forensic 
Science Research Centre; advanced 
plastic reprocessing facility. 
Sources:  
(1) HM Government (2014), http://www.glasgowcityregion.co.uk/article/7626/Projects;   
(2) HM Government (2017), https://www.gov.scot/policies/cities-regions/city-region-deals/;  
(3) HM Government (2016b); 
(4) City of Edinburgh Council (2018); 
(5) HM Government (2018b);  
(6) HM Government (2018c); Buchan (2018).   
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IV     Future considerations 
City Deals across the UK are now beginning to attract international interest and application. In 
Australia, City Deals have emerged WKURXJK WKH )HGHUDO *RYHUQPHQWöV 6PDUW &LWLHV 3ODQ
(Australian Government, 2016). Broadly following the UK model, City Deals in Australia have 
been struck for Townsville (Queensland), Launceston (Tasmania), Darwin (Northern Territory) 
and Western Sydney (NSW); and plans are underway for Geelong5 (Department of Prime Minister 
and Cabinet, 2017)). In the Netherlands, stemming from the Dutch Urban Agenda, City Deals 
reflect thematic policy areas agreed by a number of cities. As exemplified with eight cities 
siJQLQJ WKHøFLUFXODUHFRQRP\ù&LW\'HDO &LUFXODU(FRQRP\øFR-operation within and 
between XUEDQDUHDVù>LWDOLFLVHGIRUHPSKDVLV@$JHQGD6WDGPDUNVDGLVWLQFWGLIIHUHQFH
ZLWK WKH 8. YDULDQW 6XFK 'XWFK GHDOV UHIOHFW øDJUHHPHQWV EHWZHHQ SXEOic and/or private 
SDUWLHVWRKHOSFLWLHVDQGXUEDQUHJLRQVDGGUHVVSUREOHPVDQGDFKLHYHWKHLUDPELWLRQVþ&LWLHV
and other stakeholders determine the form the City Deals take, with central government acting 
DVSDUWQHUDQGIDFLOLWDWRUù*RYHUQPHQWRIWKH1Htherlands, 2015). Elsewhere support for City 
Deals has come from the former head of the US-based Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program. 
Katz (2014) ó who previously pointed to the greater potential for metro-led economic 
development policy given apparent policy stagnation at the federal level (Katz and Bradley, 
2013) - remarks that deals would be usefully considered in the US context: 
øþWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVVKRXOGFRQVLGHUDGRSWLQJVRPHRIWKHVSHFLILFYHKLFOHVE\
which the U.K. is devolving power. Central government in Britain is in the process 
RIQHJRWLDWLQJDVHULHVRIøFLW\GHDOVùZLWKHLJKWPDMRUPHWURDUHDVWKDWZLOOJUDQW
specific powers and funding to local actors. Manchester provides a shining 
example of what is possible when a national government places itself in the 
VHUYLFHRIWKHQDWXUDOHFRQRPLFJHRJUDSK\WKHPHWURSROLVù 
Such international examples illustrate the appeal of the deal-making approach to urban 
policymakers (courtesy of the promotional work of policy transfer agents (Burton, 2016)). Where 
tripartite arrangements are in place - such as in Australia - useful opportunities for learning and 
cross-national communities of practice may emerge (formalised dialogue with officials involved 
in Welsh deals may also warrant consideration). 
                                                     
5 https://www.premier.vic.gov.au/geelong-city-deal-on-the-move-with-key-players-outlining-the-path-forward/ 
[retrieved 3/12/2018] 
Economic Commentary, December 2018   85 
City Deals in Scotland also exhibit interesting evolutions as reflected in the varying content of 
the deals agreed. The Glasgow City Deal - the first deal in any of the devolved administrations - 
is comprised largely of an infrastructure fund of 20 projects spread across seven local authority 
areas.6 Transport, land remediation, site assembly and amenity improvements are dominant 
features within the fund. In contrast, the deal for Edinburgh - which was agreed in full in mid-
2018 - places much greater emphasis on innovation activities connected to universities (with 
the universities engaged at an early point).7 This raises some interesting questions: do the 
variations in emphasis across the two deals reflect the differences between the economic 
structures and bases of the cities, and thus effectively prioritise the interventions that will spur 
growth? Do the different tools and approaches taken to model the urban economies have a 
EHDULQJ",QGHHGZKLOVW*ODVJRZöVLQIUDVWUXFWXUHIXQGKLQJHGRQSURMHFWSULRULWLVDWLRQEDsed on 
the use of a land use transport integration model8(GLQEXUJKöVGHDOZDVLQIRUPHGE\WKHXVHRI
a labour market model (Maclennan, 2015). It is intriguing to consider the dimensions of the 
urban economy that each approach privileges and how that may shape the projects incorporated 
within City Deals. Additionally, the data-driven innovation initiative which features strongly in 
the Edinburgh City Deal, follows from a UK Government/BEIS-led Science and Innovation Audit 
which emphasised the potential of such economic functions (BEIS, 2016). In summary, some 
consideration of how deal-making cities have arrived at project prioritisation ó through technical 
tools, local economic knowledge bases and partnership formation ó may be useful to highlight, 
and this may reflect, to some degree, the evolution of deal-making as a learning by doing 
process. 
4XHVWLRQVDOVRH[LVWDERXWKRZQHZSROLF\LQLWLDWLYHVVXFKDVWKH8.*RYHUQPHQWöV,QGXVWULDO
Strategy, may shape or compel future deal-making. If bidding for funding to higher orders of 
government is the form through which regional and urban policy is destined to take, cities in 
Scotland will need to learn to play the game (indeed, will we see local industrial strategies 
emerge in the devolved administrations? (HM Government, 2018a: 3)). Whilst recognising the 
6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWöVGHVLUHIRUFRPSOHWHVSDWLDOFRYHUDJHSROLF\PDNHUVLQVRPHRI6FRWODQGöV
city-regions already with a City Deal ó looking at major city-regions in England that boast 
multiple growth and devolution deals, covering wider investment and service delivery areas ó 
                                                     
6 http://www.glasgowcityregion.co.uk/article/7626/Projects [retrieved 3/12/2018] 
7 http://www.acceleratinggrowth.org.uk/about-us/ [retrieved 3/12/2018] 
8 www.glasgow.gov.uk/Councillorsandcommittees/viewSelectedDocument.asp?c=P62AFQDNT1DXZ3810G 
[retrieved 3/12/2018] 
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might understandably question what deal should come next. Indeed, the idea of a follow up deal 
has been proposed for Aberdeen (Hebditch, 2018). This reflects deal-making as an iterative 
process that may further deepen asymmetric policy arrangements. 
In summary, City Deals contain a number of useful policy innovations and may present a useful 
channel to consider where policy levers and responsibilities should be located (deal-making as 
a prRFHVVQRW DVD øRQH-RIIù HYHQW +0 *RYHUQPHQW  4XHVWLRQV FDQ QHYHUWKHOHVV EH
raised as to whether this piecemeal approach to policymaking is sustainable in the long run with 
consequent spatial divides in terms of funding allocations and outcomes likely (Pike et al., 
2ö%ULHQDQG3LNH)XUWKHUPRUHWKHFRQWH[WRI%UH[LWDQGRQJRLQJORFDODXWKRULW\
budget constraints present challenges for achieving outcomes ó beyond the control of local 
authorities - for even the most well prioritised and implemented deal. At the individual city-level, 
two additional questions exist: one, will City Deals be able to withstand political change?; two, 
can we distinguish between the direct economic growth effects attributable to City Deals from 
longer-term institution and capacity building possibly brought about by deal-making? In terms 
of the latter, in other words, is it the economic impacts of the deal itself, or, in the long run, the 
new ways of working that deal-making may bring about that will prove to be most critical?  
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